I support effective policing. I want stolen cars recovered and violent offenders caught. Yet continuous, warrantless tracking of every vehicle that drives through our communities raises deeper questions about privacy, control, and the kind of society we are building. Those questions deserve serious attention.What These Systems Actually Do.

Systems advertised as “automatic license plate reader’s” (ALPRs), photograph every vehicle that passes. They record the license plate, the exact time, the location, and often the make, model, color, and other visible details. Newer versions of the technology also collect electronic identifiers from devices inside the vehicle. Bluetooth and Wi-Fi signals act like electronic fingerprints that can help identify phones and other devices even when a license plate is not visible.

The data is stored and made searchable, typically for thirty days. It is held by a private company and can be shared across a large network of other agencies. All of this happens without a warrant and without any individualized suspicion that a particular driver has done anything wrong. Every resident and every visitor is logged by default.This is not a system that only watches criminals.

It records ordinary people going about ordinary life.

Real Problems That Have Already Appeared

These concerns are not theoretical.

Independent researchers have documented serious security failures. Cameras have been found streaming live and archived footage to the open internet with no passwords required. Physical vulnerabilities have allowed people with brief access to the devices to repurpose them. Law enforcement credentials have appeared for sale on the dark web.

Officer misuse is a recurring pattern. In multiple states, officers have used the system to track romantic interests, ex-partners, or other private individuals with no legitimate law-enforcement purpose. In one Florida case a deputy placed a woman he had met on a television set onto a hotlist so he could locate and stop her. Other cases involve dozens or even hundreds of searches of a single person’s plate for personal reasons. When a system makes that kind of personal tracking easy, ordinary people have reason to be concerned.

Data sharing has also produced concrete failures of local policy. In Dayton, an audit revealed more than 7,000 immigration-related searches of the city’s camera data by outside agencies, searches that violated the city’s own rules. Officials called the violations egregious. The cameras were covered with bags while the program was suspended. In Cleveland, city officials faced intense debate after reports showed roughly 2,000 immigration-related searches of their network. A council committee initially voted against renewing the contract before later approving a shorter extension under public pressure and with new restrictions. In both cities, local leaders discovered that once the data entered a national network, their ability to control it was far more limited than they had expected.

The Privacy Problem

Most of us accept that we have a reduced expectation of privacy while driving on public roads. That is not the same as granting the government, or a private company acting on its behalf, unlimited authority to collect, store, and share detailed records of our movements over time.

In 2018 the Supreme Court ruled in Carpenter v. United States that the government generally needs a warrant to obtain historical cell-phone location data. The Court recognized that continuous and retrospective tracking of ordinary people raises serious Fourth Amendment concerns, even when those people are in public. In June 2026 the Court reinforced that principle in Chatrie v. United States, holding that people retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their location information even when it is held by a private company and covers only a limited period of time.

Dense networks of these cameras create the same kind of detailed, searchable record of daily life. They show when people leave home, where they shop, which medical offices they visit, which churches or political meetings they attend, and which friends or family members they see. Once that information is collected and shared, the practical ability of local officials to control its use largely disappears.

The Direction of the Technology

The company behind many of these systems is not standing still. It is expanding into richer vehicle details, enhanced artificial intelligence analysis, electronic device identifiers, and drone integration. Surveillance infrastructure rarely remains limited once it is installed. Capabilities grow. The range of uses tends to expand. Tools built for everyday policing are often available for broader purposes during emergencies or periods of heightened tension.

A system that tracks every vehicle today can become a system that tracks far more tomorrow. Once that infrastructure is accepted as normal, it becomes very difficult to scale back.

What Other Communities Are Doing

A growing number of cities and townships have examined these issues and chosen a different path. Some have ended contracts. Others have declined to renew them or imposed strict new limits. Public meetings in places like Oxford produced overwhelming resident concern. Dayton’s experience and Cleveland’s prolonged debate both showed how quickly local control can erode once data is shared widely across a national network.

These decisions do not reflect a rejection of public safety. They reflect a judgment that continuous, warrantless tracking of the general public carries costs that many communities are no longer willing to accept without stronger limits.

A Better Standard

Effective policing does not require permanent surveillance of every resident. Targeted investigative tools used with individualized suspicion and judicial oversight can solve crimes while respecting constitutional boundaries.

Most people want safe streets. They also want to live without creating a permanent, searchable record of their daily movements that can be accessed far beyond their local police department. A community that values both safety and liberty should not leave ordinary people wondering when and where their movements are being logged, stored, and shared by a private company.

Ending one contract is not enough if it is simply replaced by another private system that does the same thing under a different name.

Closing

This is not an attack on police officers or on the goal of solving crime. It is a question about power, permanence, and the kind of surveillance we are willing to normalize in everyday life.

Local governments still have the ability to course-correct. They can place the issue on future agendas for open discussion. They can examine contracts, data-sharing arrangements, and security records. They can decide whether continuous tracking of every vehicle is the path their communities choose.

Constitutional limits exist for a reason. Once permanent tracking infrastructure is accepted as normal, it becomes very difficult to scale back. The time to set clear boundaries is before the next expansion, not after.

Jason Purviance

Libertarian Candidate

Ohio State Representative District 47